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Summary  findings
With an increasing number of governments competing to  that operate in multiple markets, and for firms whose
attract multinational companies, fiscal incentives have  home country exempts any profit earned abroad
become a global trend that has grown considerably in the  (Canada, France) rather  than using tax credit systems
1990s. Poor African countries rely on tax holidays and  (Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States).
import duty exemptions, while industrial Western  Even if tax incentives were quite effective in increasing
European countries allow investment allowances or  investment flows, the costs might well outweigh the
accelerated depreciation. Have governments offered  benefits. Tax incentives are not only likely to have a
unreasonably large incentives to entice firms to invest in  negative direct effect on fiscal revenues but also
their countries?  frequently create significant opportunities  for illicit
Morisset and Pirnia review the literature on tax policy  behavior by tax administrators  and companies. This issue
and foreign direct investment and explore possibilities  has become crucial in emerging economies, which face
for research. They observe that tax incentives neither  more severe budgetary constraints and corruption than
make up for serious deficiencies in a country's  industrial countries do.
investment environment nor generate the desired  Morisset and Pirnia suggest research in five areas:
externalities. Long-term strategies to improve human and  *  The eventual nonlinear impact of tax rates on the
physical infrastructure-and,  where necessary, to  investment decisions of multinational companies.
streamline government policies and procedures-are  The effect of tax policy on the composition of
more likely than incentives to attract genuine long-term  foreign direct investment (for example, greenfield,
investment.  reinvested earnings, and mergers and acquisitions).
But more recent evidence has shown that when other  *  The development of new technologies and global
factors-such  as infrastructure, transport  costs, and  companies that are likely to be more sensitive to, and
political and economic stability-are  more or less equal,  able to exploit, incentives.
the taxes in one location may have a significant effect on  *  The need for a global approach to the taxation of
investors' choices. This effect is not straightforward,  multinational companies.
however. It may depend on the tax instrument used by  The question of whether  tax incentives should be
the authorities, the characteristics of the multinational  directed only at (foreign) investors that make the "right
company, and the relationships between the tax systems  things" (such as environmentally safe products) or more
in the home and recipient countries. For example, tax  broadly at those that bring jobs, technology transfers,
rebates are more important for mobile firms, for firms  and marketing skills.
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In a world where an increasing number of governments  compete hard to attract
multinational companies, fiscal incentives  have become a global phenomenon. Poor
African countries rely on tax holidays and import duty exemptions, while industrial
Western European countries allow investment allowances or accelerated depreciation
(Table 1). This trend seems to have grown considerably  since the early 1990s as
evidenced by the number of high profile foreign investments, such as Toyota in Northern
France or Mercedes-Benz A.G. in the U.S. State of Alabamna.  These have generated
considerable debate about whether governments  have offered unreasonably large
incentives to entice those firms to invest in their area. Still, this debate about the
effectiveness of tax incentives is hardly new and has accumulated  a long history. 2
The objective of the paper is to review the existing literature on tax policy and
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as to explore possibilities for future research.
Taxes affect the net return on capital and should, at least in the mind of numerous
policymakers, influence the capital movements between countries. For this reason, the
early literature attempted to evaluate if a generous tax policy could compensate for other
obstacles in the business environment and, thus, attract multinational companies.  In the
mid-  1  980s, the literature went one step further  by exploring what kind of tax instruments
should have the greatest impact on the location decision of multinational companies.
Special attention was also given to the motivations and tax behavior of the multinational
company.
In recent years, the globalization  process has led to the emergence of new issues.
Not only have companies tended to become more mobile, but also governments have to
deal with this new dimension in the design of their national tax policy. The gradual
2 According to Wells (1999), the earliest  reference was in 1160,  when wool weavers were offered tax
incentives  to locate in Biella, in the Piedmont region of Northern Italy.
2elimination of barriers to capital movements have stimulated governments  to compete for
FDI in global markets as well as reinforced the role of tax policy in this process. This
recent competitive trend has to be offset by the increasing pressure that governments face
to harmonize their tax policies within regional (or international)  agreements. A second
important issue has been the recognition  that tax policies of the home and host countries
are interconnected and that this link influences the behavior of multinationals. There has
been a great deal of evidence, especially after the changes in the U.S. tax laws during the
late 1980s,  that home country tax policy affects both the multinational firm's behavior
and the effectiveness of tax policy in the countries where these firms operate and invest.
Last but not least, there has been a growing attention  to the costs associated with tax
incentives -and not only to their possible benefits. Tax incentives are likely not only to
have a direct negative impact on fiscal revenues but also, and frequently, create
significant possibilities for suspicious  behaviors from tax administrations and companies.
This issue has become crucial in emerging countries where budgetary constraints as well
as corruption are certainly more severe than in industrial countries.
Table 1
Types of Incentives Used by Region
Region/  Africa  Asia  Latin  Central  Western  Other  Total
Major  (23)  (17)  America  &  Europe  Countries  (103)
Incentives  &  Eastern  (20)  (6)
(countries)  Caribbean  Europe
(12)  (25)
Tax holidays  16  13  8  19  7  4  67
Accelerated  12  8  6  6  10  5  47
depreciation
Investment  4  5  9  3  5  26
allowances
Import duty  1  5  1  3  11  1  3  7  4  63
exemption
Duty drawback  10  8  10  12  6  3  49
Source: UNCTAD, 1995
3This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the early literature that
examined the impact of tax policy on FDI from a global perspective  using investors'
surveys and time-series econometric analysis. Section III explores which tax instruments
have the greatest impact on FDI and what kind of foreign investors is likely to be most
responsive to changes in tax policy since these two areas have retained the attention of
many researchers over the past 15 years. Section IV focuses on three issues that have
emerged with globalization:  the interconnection  between the home and host countries
taxation and its subsequent impact on FDI; tax competition versus harmonization across
countries and states, and the costs associated with tax incentive schemes.  The last
section concludes with a few remarks and ideas for future research.
1I.  Early Literature: The Aggregate Approach
Tax policies are obviously capable of affecting the volume and location of FDI,
since all other considerations equal, higher tax rates reduce after-tax returns. Of course,
all other considerations are seldom equal. Countries do not only differ in their tax
policies, but also in their commercial  and regulatory policies, market size, natural
endowments, and human capital. All these factors influence the desirability of an
investment location.
Based on this perception, the early literature attempted to determine if tax policy
was one of the key factors in the decision-making  process of multinational companies.
Two basic approaches were and continue to be developed:  (A) selective surveys of
international investors, and (B) time-series econometric analysis. The majority of earlier
studies focused on the aggregate FDI data by lumping together firms of all types and paid
little attention to differences across sectors and industries as well as between regions and
countries. Below is presented a brief summary of the major findings.
4A.  Survey of Investors 
One of the first survey studies was conducted by Barlow and Wender in 1955.
They interviewed 247 US companies on their strategies  to invest abroad. One of the
questions asked was about the conditions that were required before companies proceed
with foreign investment. Only 10 percent of the companies listed favorable foreign taxes
as a condition for FDI, while another 11 percent mentioned "host government
encouragement to companies". Together, these inducements  were ranked fourth after
currency convertibility,  guarantee against expropriation,  and host country political
stability.
Those findings were confirmed by the survey of 205 companies conducted by
Robinson in 1961. Perhaps the most important result of Robinson's survey was the
considerable difference of opinion between the business community  and the
governments, with regards the major factors influencing  decisions to invest. Tax
concessions headed the list of government responses,  while they were omitted from the
list of private investor responses.
Next came the result of a field research conducted by Aharoni and published in
1966 on the way foreign investment decisions were made by U.S. manufacturing firms.
The conclusions were that host government concessions did not bring about the decisions
to invest. Income tax exemption  was considered a very weak stimulant. Those investors,
who did consider it, did it only marginally. In the word of one of the investors in the
survey: "Tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good to have, but it does not help very much
if the meal is not there". It should be noted that in this case, as in the case of Robinson's
interviews, host government  officials interviewed  in the field research believed income
tax exemption to be a very powerful stimulus to FDI.
In a 1984 survey of 52 multinational companies, the Group of Thirty
found that among 19 factors that were identified as influencing FDI flows, inducements
offered by the host country rank seventh in importance  for investment in developing
5countries and eight in developed countries. In recent years, several investors' surveys
explored the effectiveness of tax policies on FDI using alternative samples or asking
more detailed questions (for example, JETRO (1995), Ernst & Young (1994) or
Fortune/Deloitte & Touche (1997)). In general, these surveys have confirmed the
conclusions summarized above; that if tax policy matters it is not the most influential
factor in the site selection of multinationals. 3
B.  Econometric Analysis
The available econometric evidence on the effect of taxation used time-series
estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to annual variations in tax rates. Most
econometric studies have tended to confirm the results of surveys; that investors are
mostly influenced in their decision by market and political factors and that tax policy
appear to have little effect on the location of FDI.
A selective sample of studies has concluded in that direction: Root and Ahmed
(1978), Agodo (1978), Shah and Toye (1978), and Lim (1983). In 1978, Root and
Ahmed performed an econometric study with data for 41 developing countries for the
period 1966-1970. They classified countries in three categories of unattractive,
moderately attractive, and highly attractive according to their average annual per capita
inflow of FDI.  Forty-four variables were chosen as potentially significant discriminators
of the three country groups. Among the six policy related discriminators  were three
relating to tax levels. Of these, corporate tax rates proved to be an effective discriminator
of the three defined country groups; however tax incentives laws and liberality were not
found to be effective discriminators. Agodo analyzed a sample of 33 US firms having 46
manufacturing investment in 20 African countries. Tax concessions were found to be
insignificant as a determinant of FDI in simple and multiple regressions.
Much of the literature of the period used highly aggregate data, evaluating the
correlation between annual changes in FDI flows, and a series of factors, including
In the Fortune/Deloitte  & Touche's survey, taxes ranked at the 13  t  position out of 26 factors.
6movements in after-tax rates of return earned by foreign investments. The primary
limitation of aggregate studies is that changes in FDI may be correlated with important
omitted variables such as trade and financial liberalization as well as the elimination of
barriers against FDI.  Most countries embark in a reform process that includes
simultaneous actions aimed at enhancing the development of private investment,
including FDI promotion. As a result, it becomes very difficult to distinguish the effects
of taxation from the effects of other variables that are in turn correlated with tax rates.
There is also the crucial issue of how to define tax policy changes and to measure
the after-tax rate of return. Which taxes should be included in the regressions (corporate
profit tax, trade taxes, domestic indirect taxes, etc.)?  Should these taxes be integrated in
one aggregate or several indicators? Several studies have employed nominal tax rates but
they can be misleading for a variety of reasons. In particular, they do not capture the
eventual tax rebates that are offered to specific investments or activities. Understanding
the exact impact of tax policy on investment decisions has led to the development of the
popular concept of effective tax rate, which is defined as the percentage reduction in the
financial rate of return on an investment that is due to the fiscal system of the host
country. 4 In principle, both the effective marginal and average tax rates 5 may be relevant
in the strategic decisions made by firms. Locating production in an area with low
marginal rate should lead to a high optirnal level of output, while the average rate will
affect the profit level. 6  In a recent econometric study on the behavior of US firms in the
European Union, Devereux and Griffith (1998) have shown that the average effective tax
rates seem to have a greater impact on the FDI location that the marginal tax rates.
Still, the general conclusion that emerged from the early econometric studies is
that the effect of tax policy on FDI is rather limited, at least compared to other factors
such as political stability, the costs and availability of labor and basic infrastructure. The
4 There exists a considerable  literature around this concept, which include recent developments  such as
uncertainty, relations between labor and capital taxes, and indirect  taxes. Several studies can be found in
Anwar Shah (1995).
5The average rate can be viewed as the marginal  rate multiplied by the statutory average tax rate
7importance of these other factors suggests that tax policy is a poor instrument to
compensate  for various negative factors in the investment climate of a country. Many
countries from South America to Sub-Saharan  Africa have offered investment incentives
for businesses to locate in underdeveloped,  more costly, and otherwise  unattractive
regions with little success in generating (sustainable) investment  flows to those areas.
This experience strongly suggests  that the fiscal investment incentives  popular in
developing countries have not been effective in making up for fundamental  weaknesses
in the investment climate.
III.  New evidence from the mid-80s:  A look for Details
The relative little importance  of tax policy does not mean that it does not exert
any impact on FDI. Looking at foreign direct investment figures, it is certainly not a
coincidence that FDI in tax haven countries in the Caribbean and South Pacific grew
more than fivefold between 1985 and 1994, to over $200 billion. Ireland's tax policy has
been generally recognized as a key factor in its success to attract international investors
over the past two decades. In fact, the simple position described in the preceding section
was not completely accurate. It is not true that tax policy and incentives fail to attract
investors; they do affect the decisions  of some investors some of the time.
Even in the 1  970s, there were researchers who started to look into more detailed
FDI data and came out with conclusions  that made the result of previous studies more
vulnerable to criticism. Forsyth in his 1972 study provides support for the view that
inducements and incentives may often not play a key role in influencing  the decision to
undertake a particular foreign investment. However, once other factors have provoked
the decisions to set up production facilities in a broad area, then the more precise location
decision may be strongly affected by such factors.
6 It has to be noted that in principle  the locational decision of the firm may be affected by the marginal and
average rates in two opposite directions. When the average level is high in one country, it is possible that
the overall profit level may be less than in another country even though its marginal rate is lower.
8By mid-1980s, underktanding  the exact role of incentives in attracting FDI
became a new research agenda. One direction has been to explore the reaction of
multinational companies to changes in tax policy when they differ in their activities,
motivations, market structure an/or financing. Others have searched to examine which
tax instruments may have the greater effect on the behavior of international investors.
A.  Tax Behavior of Multinational Companies
While most early studies examine  the impact of taxes on the average foreign
investors, there were many reasons to believe that this impact differs greatly depending
on the characteristics of the multinational  company. International investors often have at
their disposal numerous alternative  methods of structuring and financing their
investments, arranging their transactions between related parties located in different
countries, and returning profits to investors. These alternatives  have important tax
implications, and there is considerable  anecdotal evidence that tax considerations
strongly influence the choices that firmns  make.
One of the earlier findings of the literature is that the impact of tax rates on
investment decisions is generally higher on export-oriented  companies than those seeking
the domestic market or location-specific  advantages. In surveys,  these firms are those with
managers  that have responded  more favorably  to tax incentives  (see Reuber (1973)7  and
Guisinger (1985)). This finding is not really surprising because export-oriented  firms such
as garmnent  manufacturers  are operating  in highly  competitive  markets  with very slim
7 For his study, Reuber separated investors into different groups according to their type investment (market
seeking or export oriented). He used 80 investment projects in various industries  of thirty developing
countries, made by companies  from various national origin. The companies surveyed were asked to
identify, among various incentives,  which one was deemed so important  that its absence would have caused
the abandonment of the project or major changes in it. Among export oriented projects, 48% named fiscal
incentives  (including tax holidays, duty remission and acce!erated  depreciation). Among market oriented
projects, 56%.of responses named protection of the market as the prevailing factor. By using a different
approach to define the problem, Reuber showed that investment  incentives might not matter to all investors
but they do matter to some investors having a specific investment strategy ( e.g. export platform). Another
merit of the study is to pose the question "do incentive matter?" in terms of the location of the projects
rather than a broader decision to carry out FDI.
9margins. Moreover,  these firms are often  highly mobile,  and more likely to compare  taxes
across alternative  locations  (Wells 1986). Hence,  taxes can  be an important  part of their cost
structure,  and the firms can easily move to take advantage  of more favorable  tax regimes.
The impact and the nature of incentive schemes  may also differ if they apply to
new or existing companies. For example, Rolfe et al. (1993) shows, using a survey of
managers of US firms, that start-up companies will prefer incentives that reduce their
initial expenses (equipment and material exemption), while expanding firms will prefer
tax incentives  that target profit. He also reports that manufacturing industries will prefer
incentives related to depreciable assets because they utilize more fixed assets than service
industries.
In an interesting study, Coyne (1994) suggests that small investors are generally
more responsive to tax incentives than large ones. Taxes may play a more important role
in the cost structure of small companies because they do not have the financial and
human capacity to developed sophisticated  tax avoidance strategies. Large multinational
companies are also more likely to receive special tax treatments, whatever the tax laws
applied by the host country. Oman (2000) reports some evidence  that large firms,
especially in the automobile sector, are more likely to negotiate secret advance
agreements on how much they will pay in both industrial and emerging countries.
There exist a few studies that estimate separate equations for FDI financed by
retained earnings and external funds (equity plus debt) (Hartman (1984) and Boskin and
Gale (1987)). They typically found that FDI financed by retained earnings is more
strongly influenced  by host country tax rates. However, they do not offer any clear
explanation  for this result, but it is possible that equity and debt financing are also
influenced by the tax policy in the home country,  thereby reducing the impact of the host
country's tax regimes (see next section for more explanations).
Finally, there is growing evidence that low taxes might be a key factor for firms
that are not operating in one specific but multiple markets such as Internet related
10business, insurance companies and banks. Establishing a subsidiary in a low tax country
gives them the opportunity to develop tax avoidance strategies. It is indeed difficult for
any one country to claim the right to tax the holding company if its operations have taken
place in multiple markets at the same time.  A typical example is when filing tax returns
in a high tax country, a multinational company claims that it has earned as little profits as
possible.  Instead, it tries to attribute as much profit as possible to its operations in low-
tax countries by arranging "transactions" between its subsidiaries in the two countries,
and setting the "transfer price" of those transactions so that it has the desired effect on
profits.  Multinationals can also adjust the timing of their dividend repatriations from
foreign subsidiaries (see Hines and Hubbard (1990)). In practice, such strategies may
explain the success of tax havens countries in attracting subsidiaries of "global"
companies and the expenses made by multinationals on economists and accountants to
justify their transfer prices that suit their tax needs.  Still, very little is known about the
magnitude of such international tax evasion and how much do they affect tax revenues
across countries (see for some preliminary evidence, Grubert, Goodspeed and Swensson
(1993) or the Economist (2000)).
B.  Tax Instruments Used by Governments
Governments have several tax instruments that they can use to attempt to
influence the effective tax rates and the location decision of multinational companies. 8
The literature  has traditionally  focused  on the instruments  linked  to the corporate  income tax
such as tax holidays and tax allowance. Of course, these instruments are of no help to an
unprofitable company and, therefore, other forms of incentives  have also been widely
used around the world.  Exemptions from custom duties or local indirect taxes (generally
to targeted sectors) do exist in many countries, even though their use has been restricted
in most international and bilateral trade treaties. Outright  grants are used in many
industrial countries but rarely in the developing world because of their upfront costs.
8  For example, an effective tax rate in the United States of about 25% at the end of 1994 was produced by
a 38% corporate tax rate combined with no investment  tax allowance, depreciation rates on buildings of
4.4% and 18.6% on machinery, and an number of other assumptions  about inflation, interest rates (interest
11Following the existing literature, our focus is on the corporate income tax and the
different options used by governments  to relieve companies. Governments  with high
corporate tax rates have a number of options  to reduce  them to more competitive  levels.
One is to give tax incentives  to a selected  group of firms. An alternative  is to change  the
general fiscal system to lower the effective  tax rate for all firms. There are many options
between these two extremes, including  the "stability  premium" that have been offered  to
investors  by countries such as Chile and Colombia. This premium consists in an option
where the investor  purchases  the right to maintain its corporate  tax rate at a given  level, even
if the tax regime will be modified  in the future. Below is presented  a short review of the
major options  but, at the outset,  it is worth underscoring  that there is certainly  no clear-cut
answer in favor of one or another alternative  mechanism  (see Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1992),
for fuller details).
The first option is to generalize a low corporate tax rate on a broad base.  Small
countries such as Hong Kong, Lebanon or Mauritius have typically retained this option.
A low corporate tax rate is, in itself, an incentive. It allows investors to keep a larger
portion of profits.  Governments are also able to maintain corporate tax revenues because
investors have limited tax-planning opportunities and the simplicity of the system makes
for a favorable investment climate. Investors look favorably on a country offering a low
statutory tax rate, especially one well below the worldwide norm of 35 percent to 40
percent, since it signals that the government is interested  in letting the market determine
the most profitable investments without undue governmental  influence. Although a
broad-based low corporate tax rate is appealing, this approach has limitations. In
particular, international linkages can undermine a country's  efforts to make its tax system
relatively neutral. In fact, a country with a corporate tax system greatly out of line with
other countries might be better off having a less neutral system to minimize distortions.
It has also to be recognized that the sudden change to a low, generalized tax rate can
reduce tax revenues during a transition period, even though the simplicity of the tax
is deductible),  etc. Approximately  the same  effective  tax rate  was achieved  in Spain  with  a lower  corporate
tax rate  (35%),  and lower  rates  of depreciation  of buildings  (3%)  and  equipment  (12%).
12system may attract further investors and increase the tax base in the longer run and so
compensate for the initial reduction.
For these reasons, many govemnmrents  rely on tax incentive schemes in their effort
to lure foreign investors. This selective approach, in contrast to a generalized tax
reduction, is attractive  to many countries  because it may minimize  the initial effect on fiscal
revenues  and, in principle,  should help to target specific  industries  or activities  that would
bring the greater benefits  to the country. It can also be argued  that incentives  may have a
signaling  effect on the government's commitments  to stimulate  FDI, as they are generally
easier to implement  than a general  reform of the tax system (see Bond and Samuelson
(1986)).
One popular form of tax incentive consists of reducing the corporate income tax
rate by providing tax holidays or temporary rebates. This form of incentive has been
popular in emerging countries where authorities  have favored a discretionary  approach.
For example, several African Investment Codes have included tax holidays, with
differentiated rebates and periods of abatement, depending on the government's
objectives. The main benefit of tax holidays is that they provide large benefits as soon as
the company begins earning income, and are thus more valuable than an incentive such as
a lower corporate tax rate that accrues more slowly over a longer time.  However, they
primarily benefit short-term investments, which often are undertaken in so-called
footloose industries characterized  by companies that can quickly disappear from one
jurisdiction to reappear in another. They also tend to reward the founding of a company,
rather than investment in existing companies and discriminate against investments that
rely on long-lived depreciable capital. Last but not least, they can lead to large erosion of
the tax base as taxpayers learn how to escape taxation of income from other sources.9
9 For example, during the holiday years, companies operate at a preferential corporate tax rate.  When
corporate taxpayers have a choice, they have incentive  to shift income into a company enjoying the tax
holiday and take more deductible expenses in another company they may own that must pay taxes. They
would prefer to have the taxpaying company incur interest costs on borrowed finance and the tax holiday
company to be financed with equity. In fact, the tax holiday company  could hold debt in the non-holiday
company. The non-holiday company  can deduct interest while the tax-holiday company  earns the interest
tax-free.
13Many countries, especially in the industrial world, allow fast write-offs for
investment expenditures -- either all investments,  or those they especially want to induce
through tax allowances or credits.'0 Investment tax allowances have distinct advantages.
The incentive is correctly  targeted at the desired activity since a company receives the
benefit of lower corporate taxes only if it makes capital investments (rather than
formation of a new company). It encourages companies to take a long-term view when
planning investments. By targeting current capital spending,  the allowance causes less
revenue leakage than would a tax holiday, and it promotes new investment instead of
giving a windfall gain to owners of old capital, as does a reduction in corporate tax rates.
It can also be made refundable, allowing the government  to share the investment costs
and risks with the foreign entrepreneur. Still, investment  tax allowances have limitations
and drawbacks. If the investment  tax allowance is not refundable, existing companies
reap the full benefits (i.e. supporting expansion)  while start-up companies must first earn
enough income before they can take the allowance. Also, projects with long gestation
periods suffer in comparison with those that begin earning income quickly. When
inflation is high, the allowance aggravates the tax system's uneven impact on the
investment  behavior of companies. Companies in high-inflation  countries will benefit
more if they borrow to finance capital, because tax deductions for capital expenditures
are more valuable. This is the reverse of the tax holiday and of lower corporate tax rates,
which reduce the advantages of interest cost deductions for tax purposes during high
inflation.
Finally, an extreme approach  has been to reduce  or simply  eliminate  taxes to all or
specific  investors. Some countries  have become  tax heavens,  especially  in the Caribbean
and Pacific  regions. They generally  chose to suppress  all direct income taxes and rely on
indirect  consumption  and employment  taxes. Other countries  have limited  those benefits  to
specific areas  and export  oriented activities  -the so-called  Export  Processing  Zones (EPZs).
10 These allowances take three forms: (1) accelerated  depreciation,  which allows companies  to write off
capital more quickly for tax purposes than for accounting;  (2) an investment expenditure allowance that lets
companies write off a percentage of qualifying investment expenditures  from their taxable income; and (3)
14These zones usually provide  a number  of benefits  to finns that export  a minimum  share of
total output (usually  more than 70 to 80 percent). In virtually  all of these zones there is a tax
holiday for a substantial  period of time (often 1  0 years) coupled  with a reduction or
elimination  of import taxes on machinery  and production  inputs. In addition,  the zones
usually  provide less cumbersome  procedures  for importing  and exporting.
Tax heaven countries  have been successful  in encouraging  FDI, but this has to be
qualified  as they principally  attracted  mobile companies  or activities  that are relatively
global such as banking  and insurance  as well as Internet companies. Today,  the Cayman
Islands claims that it is the fifth largest  financial  center, as it is home to subsidiaries  of 45 of
the world's largest banks. It has to be noted  that tax heavens  have been much less
successful  in convincing  multinational  firms to relocate their corporate  home than
establishing  new subsidiaries,  partly reflecting  the tax and regulatory costs of doing so from
the home countries  (Collins  and Shackelfold  (1995)). The experience  with EPZ has been
mixed as reported by Magati (1999). It remains unclear  if the benefits (employment,
exports) outweigh  the costs (foregone  tax revenues,  distortions  in the allocation  of
resources). In many countries,  such regimes  have created  a dichotomy  between the EPZ
companies  and those operating  under the common  regime. The capacity of custom  and tax
administrations  to properly  manage and control  EPZ companies  has also been a crucial
element  in the performance  of EPZ.
IV.  Recent Issues in a Global World
In recent years, the globalization  process and the gradual elimination of barriers to
capital movements, including FDI, across countries have led to the emergence of new
issues. The first issue that has received a growing attention from researchers has been the
interaction between the home and host countries' taxation regimes and its resulting
an investment tax credit that allows companies  to reduce taxes paid by a percentage of investment
expenditures.
15impact on FDI flows. Second, the issue of tax competition  between countries and across
regions has also become widely debated in view of the growing importance of this
phenomenon worldwide. Finally, several widely publicized  recent deals have revealed
that a few multinational companies have received large, perhaps disproportionate,  tax
rebates, suggesting that the costs and not only the benefits of tax incentives  need to be
examined more closely. These three issues are reviewed below.
A.  Home country tax policy
In the presence of international capital mobility, home-country corporate income
tax rates and rules about how taxes paid in the host country are considered at home
should influence FDI. In fact, such influence was recognized a long time ago by the
bilateral agreements  that were signed to avoid double taxation of income between
countries (see UNCTAD, 1995). The current literature has emphasized two additional
effects: 1) the influence of the home country's tax system on the efficacy of the tax
incentives granted by the host country, and 2) its impact on the way multinational do
business abroad.
Home country's taxation rules affect the effectiveness  of tax incentives in the host
country. Most FDI outflows originate from OECD countries, with different regimes on
how they tax the activities of their multinationals abroad. For example, the foreign tax
paid by U.S. companies can be claimed as a tax credit on the U.S. tax liabilities (up to a
rate of 35 percent). Japan and U.K. use similar tax credit systems, while other countries
such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands exempt more or less
any profits earned abroad from home-taxation. In 1996, Hines compared the distribution
of FDI within the U.S. of foreign investors whose home governments grant foreign tax
credits for federal income and state income taxes with those whose governments do not
tax income earned in the United States. His findings reveal that companies with home
tax-free rules (France, Canada, etc.) have more invested in low tax states that those that
have to pay taxes in their home country (Japan and U.K).'1 In a more recent paper of
Note that Slemrod (1990) did not find any clear pattern at the country (rather than the State) level.
161998,  the same author found that Japanese firms have a tendency to favor investment in
countries where Japan has agreements to claim foreign  tax credits for income taxes that
they would have paid to foreign governments  in the absence of tax holidays.  1 2 From a
policy perspective,  these two findings seem to indicate that tax incentives are more
effective when they apply to firms from countries whose governments do not tax their
foreign activities.
Some recent evidence has shown that the home country's taxation system is likely
to influence the way their multinational  companies do business abroad. Hines and
Hubbard (1990) and Grubert (1998) found that it is attractive  for U.S. firms to use debt to
finance foreign investment in high tax countries (compared to the U.S.) and equity in low
tax countries. The argument is that the debt generates interest deductions for the
subsidiary and so reduces its taxable income in the host country (note that the parent firm
has to pay additional taxes, but at a lower rate, in the U.S.). Harris (1993) uses firm-level
data to illustrate that the Tax Reform Act of 1986  in the United States pushed U.S. firms
with higher equipment/structure  ratios to invest abroad more heavily because their tax
regime encouraged such an action. A series of other recent studies have found similar
results for preferred stock issuances (Collins and Shakelford (1992)) or domestic versus
foreign borrowing (Atshuler and Mintz (1995). An interesting finding is that the 1986
Tax Reform has also influenced  the form of business organization that the multinational
will select in the foreign country. For example, since 1986, American investors have had
fewer tax incentives to participate in joint ventures, particularly in low tax foreign
countries, and the number for this type of foreign investmnents  fell sharply as reported by
Desai and Hines (1999).
Finally, the importance of the home-country tax system can also be illustrated by
the efforts of tax authorities to prevent the transfer of multinationals' headquarters or
other specific activities (such as R&D) to other countries. Many governments negotiate
12 Hines shows that Japanese firms are subject to 23 percent lower tax rates than their American
counterparts in countries which whom Japan has agreements. In other world, Japanese firms have a greater
propensity to invest when they can benefit from tax incentives  than when they cannot not because they
would have to pay taxes in Japan.
17contractual arrangements  or, and often simultaneously,  impose high penalties if the
multinational company decides to do so. For example, the costs of moving a parent
company, if it is already incorporated  in the United States,  are prohibitive because the tax
administration generally takes the view that the firm is selling off its assets, and levy a
substantial capital gain tax.  On the other hand, the US tax system provides incentives to
local R&D if imported technology and local technology are substitutes, and thus
discourage US firms to move those activities abroad (see Hines 1999).
B.  Harmonization  vs. Tax Competition
In recent years, there has been new empirical  evidence  that tax rates and incentives
influence  the location  decision  of companies  within  regional economic  groupings,  such as
the European  Union, NAFTA, or ASEAN. The location  decision  of foreign companies
within  the U.S. has also retained  the attention  of several  researchers  (Ondrich and
Wasylenko (1993) and Swensson (1994)). As an illustration of this effect, Devereux and
Griffith (1998) found that the average effective tax rate plays a significant role in the
choice of US companies to locate within Europe. This factor, however, does not seem to
influence  the choice of whether to locate in Europe compared with one of the outside
options (domestic or other foreign markets).
Such findings confirms the idea that was put forward by Forsyth (1972) about 30
years ago. The potential effectiveness  of fiscal incentives  is that they are able to make a
difference between competing  jurisdictions where the basic, more important conditions,
in other words the fixed locational characteristics,  are more or less equivalent. These
jurisdictions may be subnational or in different countries included in a supranational
unified market (e.g. the European Union). Here, once a locational decision is narrowed
down to a handful of alternative sites, incentives can play a decisive role in the final
locational choice.
Since tax policy seems to have a greater impact on the location decision within
regional markets, the argument is that it can push governments to "race to the bottom"
18with competitive tax reductions. The main concern is that the various countries may end
up in a bidding war that results in a "prisoner's dilemma" that benefits the foreign firms
at the expense of the winning State and the welfare of its citizens.
The issue of tax competition across countries or regions has led to many studies in
the past few years. For example,  Haaparanta (1996) shows that countries will engage in
tax bidding process to attract FDI, if their key motivation is to create  jobs.  The same
reasoning could apply to R&D. Hauffer and Wooton (1999) suggest that the size of the
host country may also matter. In principle, countries with large domestic markets are
capable of taxing more FDI because they benefit from positive agglomeration effects but
this advantage decreases with lower trade costs, as it may happen in regional grouping
and Trade Union. Overall, the outcome of tax competition is generally ambiguous
because it depends on many factors. Among a few of them, do governments enter in
cooperative or non-cooperative  contests? Do firms operate in a competitive  or non-
competitive market? What kinds of tax instruments  do the governments use?
In reality, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of tax competition across countries
or within a country because of the inherent difficulty  of obtaining any reliable data from
governments and even more so from firms (see Oman (2000) for a tentative assessment in
several countries and regions). Tax competition seems to be more intensive in some
sectors such as automotive and for larger firms. In any case, both the European Union
and OECD have declared that tax competition is harmful to countries. However, this
view has to be contrasted with the argument that variations in tax regimes are a good
thing because they give tax payers more choice, and thus more chance of being satisfied,
as well as some pressure on governments  to compete  by offering different combinations
of public services and taxes.
Recent efforts to hannonize tax systems have been launched both in the industrial
and developing world. For example, it has been one of the major objectives of the
European Union, where member countries are discussing more stable, predictable and
transparent tax rules for investors and governments  alike. A first step was achieved in
19December 1997 with the adoption of the Code of Conduct for business taxation in which
member states agree not to introduce "harmful" tax measures and to roll back existing
harmful measures. Similarly,  several West African countries have been undertaking a
joint effort to harmonize their tax incentives for FDI in one unified Investment Code
within the Monetary Union of West African States. These processes have been slow and
the challenge remains great at both the political and economic levels. The fact of the
matter is that the temptation to use tax incentives for attracting FDI will certainly increase
as a consequence of the growing mobility of capital and companies across countries and
regions as well as the homogenization of basic fundamentals  across (larger) economic
areas.
C  The Costs of Fiscal Incentives
The debate about the effectiveness of incentives in attracting investment -the
potential benefit side - has diverted the attention from the cost side. Even if tax incentive
were quite effective in increasing investment flows, the costs might well outweigh the
benefits. This issue has become critical in view of the increase in tax competition around
the world.  This competition is not only taken place in relatively wealthy industrial
countries but also in emerging markets where governments  generally face severe
budgetary constrains. 1 3
There is no doubt that tax incentives are costly. The first and most direct costs are
those associated with the potential loss of revenues for the host governnent. 14 The
argument here is to determine if the new foreign investment  would have come to the
country if no or lower incentives  were offered. In such cases, "free rider" investors
benefit, whilst the Treasury loses, and there are no net benefits to the economy. An
interesting  recent study on the State of South Carolina in the US (Figlio and Blonigen
1999) has shown that foreign direct investment  has several important negative impacts on
13 This  is certainly  the main  argument  why  tax incentives  are frequently  eliminated  in budgetary  crisis;  see
recent examples of East Asian countries (e.g., Indonesia) as discussed by Wells (1999).
I4  It is estimated that the direct and indirect fiscal "cost-per-job" of incentives received by investors in the
automobile industry often exceeds US$100,000 (see Oman (2000)).
20the State budget, in fact more than new domestic investment. Not only they generated
more revenue losses (an average sized new foreign firm is associated with a 1.2 percent
reduction in real per capita revenues while a domestic firm only 0.1 percent) but also
additional expenses on infrastructure  and education, even though those may have indirect
benefits for the economy. These results simply illustrate that attracting foreign
companies is not a "zero-sum game" from a public finance perspective.
Tax policy and incentives  have many, perhaps less evident, additional costs.
Indeed, the argument for their efficacy  presuppose that tax authorities are capable of
identifying the "positive externalities" of investments, and determine the exact level of
tax incentives  required to attract the investor. Most incentive programs have relied on
vague assessments of potential externalities, and presumptions  of policymakers about
both the desirability and likelihood of attracting certain types of investments. 15 The
distortionary effects of incentives on the allocation of resources can be significant as they
bias the investment decisions of private companies. Incentives can be further
counterproductive if they contribute  to attracting more investors of the "wrong kind",
which is certainly the case in countries where basic fundamentals  are not yet in place.
Another problem with incentive measures relates less to whether they achieve
their objectives  than to the difficulty  and cost of administering  them effectively. Put
another way, incentive regimes generally impose a significant administrative  burden, and
must therefore be more than marginally effective in order to cover the costs of
implementing them and produce a net overall benefit. On this point, it is worth
mentioning the difference between discretionary  regimes, which depend upon case by
case evaluations, and non-discretionary  regimes, which grant incentives to whatever
company meets clearly stated requirements. Difficult-to-administer  discretionary  regime
result in delays and uncertainty for investors, which can even increase the overall cost of
making an investment in some countries. They have also been significant sources of
corruption, effectively screening out desirable investment,  and detrimental to the
'5 Even if incentives are effective in attracting more investment, the fact is that they distort the profit
signals to investors. Thus, unless the envisaged externalities can somehow be generated, the resources used
by a government to fund incentive measures are being put to less than optimal use.
21processes of developing competitive  markets and sound policy-making. In contrast,
automatic incentive regimes are easier to implement, and generally  involve such
incentives as investment tax credits, accelerated  depreciation, and subsidies linked to
indicators that can be easily measured (exports, technology imports, skilled labor). One
has to keep in mind, however, that successful examples like Singapore or Ireland are rare.
They have been more governments  that failed to attract FDI with targeted tax incentives,
explaining why the recent trend has been to eliminate  and streamline tax incentive
programs. In fact, it seems that multinationals  give more importance to simplicity and
stability in the tax system than generous tax rebates, especially in an environment with
great political and institutional risks (see Ernst & Young (1994)).
V.  Concluding Remarks and Next Steps
In summary, incentives will generally neither make up for serious deficiencies in
the investment environment,  nor generate  the desired externalities. Thus, advisors often
counsel long-run strategies of improving human and physical infrastructure,  and where
necessary streamlining government policies and procedures, thereby increasing the
chances of attracting investment on a genuine long-term basis. Indeed, the importance of
fundamental factors like economic conditions and political climate is underlined by the
fact the most serious investors are often unaware of the full range of incentives on offer
when they invest, and that they often do not consider alternative  locations.
Recent evidence has nevertheless shown that, when other factors such as political
and economic stability, infrastructure  and transport costs are more or less equal between
potential locations, taxes may exert a significant impact. This is evidenced by the
growing tax competition in regional groupings such as the European Union or at the sub-
regional level within one country (e.g., the U.S.). This impact, however, has to be
qualified on two important counts. First, the impact of tax policy may significantly
depend on the tax instruments used by the authorities. For example, tax holidays and a
22general reduction in the statutory tax rate may have an equivalent impact on the effective
tax rate but significantly different effects on FDI flows and government's revenues.
Second, The effectiveness of tax policy and incentives  is also likely to vary depending on
the multinational firm's activity and on its motivations for investing abroad. For
example, tax incentives seem to be a crucial factor for mobile firms or firms that operate
in multiple markets because they can exploit better the different tax regimes across
countries.
The debate around the impact of taxes and fiscal incentives on FDI is far from
being over. Old questions will lead to new answers, and news questions will also emerge
in the future. Among all these possibilities, we would like to focus on  five directions that,
we believe, offer ideas for future research. The first direction consists of the eventual
non-linear impact of tax rates on the investment  decision  of multinational  companies. A
look at the reality suggests  that countries  with excessive  tax rates can kill foreign  direct
investment  but those with reasonable  tax rates may exert little  or no influence  on it. At the
other extreme, the success of tax heaven countries indicates that extremely low tax rates
may also attract foreign investors, at least some of them. There is a need for a detailed
econometric evidence of those non-linear effects as they may have implications for
policy-makers that aim at using tax policy to attract foreign investors.
The second direction for research could be to examine more closely the effect of
tax policy on the composition of FDI (e.g., greenfield, reinvested earnings, and mergers
and acquisition). There have been only a few studies on this aspect, most of the authors
preferring to focus on the level of total FDI in the country. However, depending on the
tax policy or the fiscal incentives, foreign investors may choose alternative ways to invest
abroad. For example, as mentioned in the previous section, recent changes in the US tax
policy seem to have discouraged US joint ventures. By having a better understanding of
how tax policies affect the composition of FDI, policy makers in host countries would
have a better chance of attracting the right type of investment  and maximizing its impact
on the economy.
23The third direction  is linked to the development  of new technologies. As a matter
of fact the Internet have the potential to increase tax competition, not least by making it
much easier for multinationals  to shift their activities to low-tax regimes, that are
physically a long way from their customers,  but virtually are only a mouse-click away.
As reported in The Economist (2000), "many more companies may be able to emulate
Rupert Murdoch 's News Corporation,  which has earned  profits of US2.  3 billion in
Britain since 1987 but paid no corporation tax there". The emergence of global
companies will have a significant impact on government  revenues. These companies are
likely to be much sensitive to tax incentives  as they will be more capable to exploit them
by transferring their activities from one country to another. Additional evidence is
certainly needed on this rapidly expending sector of the economy.
The fourth direction concerns  the need for a global approach to the taxation of
multinational companies. Within that vision, the following areas merit further attention:
(1) should countries harmonize their tax regimes and, if yes, how? (2) should "transfer
pricing" or other techniques used by multinational companies to exploit cross-country
differences in tax regimes be restricted as followed recently by U.S. tax legislators who
have the possibility to force companies to repatriate their profits if the authorities
consider that they attempt to avoid taxation? (3) Should a global agency calculate the
profit of global companies worldwide and then allocate it to individual countries on the
basis of a formula that reflect the firm's  presence in that country? Today, those areas
offer more questions than answers,  but it has to be recognized that a global approach is
increasingly needed because national boundaries  are fading away, and national tax
administrations  are losing their control over taxpayers.
The fifth and last direction lies in the question  whether tax incentives should only
be directed at (foreign) investors that make the "right things" in the host country, such as
environment-safe  projects, or those leading to employment  or transfers of technology and
marketing skills. This new trend caught the attention of a few researchers in the past few
years. For example, Markusen et al. (1995) study a model where governments compete
through environmental taxes when productive activity causes local pollution (see also
24Rauscher (1995)). Hines (1995) found that American owned-foreign  affiliates are more
R& D intensive if located in countries that impose high withholding taxes on royalty
payments, and similarly, that foreign firms investing in the United States are more R&D
intensive if they are subject to higher royalty withholding  taxes. Recently, Blonigen and
Slaughter (1999) suggest that tax policy influence the magnitude of which foreign
affiliates use skilled labor and transfer new technologies in the host country. These
recent studies indicate that tax policy can be used not only to attract foreign investors but
also to regulate some of their activities in the host economy. This issue merit further
attention from research, especially at there is need for additional evidence of these
possible effect both at the country and enterprise level.
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